Dismantling
Yugoslavia; Colonizing Bosnia
|
By Michel Chossudovsky (2-15-00)
www.tenc.net [The
Emperor's New Clothes]
Michel Chossudovsky is Professor of
Economics, University of Ottawa.
While Western soldiers make headlines as peace
enforcers, an army of international bankers, lawyers, and
creditors continues its economic conquest of the Balkans.
As heavily-armed US and NATO troops enforce
the peace in Bosnia, the press and politicians alike
portray Western intervention in the former Yugoslavia as
a noble, if agonizingly belated, response to an outbreak
of ethnic massacres and human rights violations.
In the wake of the November 1995 Dayton peace
accords, the West is eager to touch up its self-portrait
as savior of the Southern Slavs and get on with "the
work of rebuilding" the newly sovereign states.
But following a pattern set early on, Western
public opinion has been misled. The conventional wisdom
holds that the plight of the Balkans is the outcome of an
"aggressive nationalism," the inevitable result
of deep-seated ethnic and religious tensions rooted in
history (1). Likewise, commentators cite "Balkans
power-plays" and the clash of political
personalities to explain the conflicts.(2)
Lost in the barrage of images and self-serving
analyses are the economic and social causes of the
conflict. The deep- seated economic crisis which preceded
the civil war is long forgotten. The strategic interests
of Germany and the US in laying the groundwork for the
disintegration of Yugoslavia go unmentioned, as does the
role of external creditors and international financial
institutions. In the eyes of the global media, Western
powers bear no responsibility for the impoverishment and
destruction of a nation of 24 million people.
But through their domination of the global
financial system, the Western powers, in pursuit of
national and collective strategic interests, helped bring
the Yugoslav economy to its knees and stirred its
simmering ethnic and social conflicts. Now it is the turn
of Yugoslavia's war-ravaged successor states to feel the
tender mercies of the international financial community.
As the world focuses on troop movements and
cease-fires, the international financial institutions are
busily collecting former Yugoslavia's external debt from
its remnant states, while transforming the Balkans into a
safehaven for free enterprise. With a Bosnian peace
settlement holding under NATO guns, the West has unveiled
a "reconstruction" program that strips that
brutalized country of sovereignty to a degree not seen in
Europe since the end of World War II. It consists largely
of making Bosnia a divided territory under NATO military
occupation and Western administration.
Neocolonial Bosnia
Resting on the Dayton accords, which created a
Bosnian "constitution," the US and the European
Union have installed a full-fledged colonial
administration in Bosnia. At its head is their appointed
High Representative, Carl Bildt, a former Swedish prime
minister and European Union representative in Bosnian
peace negotiations (3). Bildt has full executive powers
in all civilian matters, with the right to overrule the
governments of both the Bosnian Federation and the
Republika Srpska (Serbian Bosnia). It make the point
crystal clear, the accords spell out that "The High
Representative is the final authority in theater
regarding interpretation of the agreements."(4) He
will work with the multinational military implementation
force (IFOR) Military High Command as well as creditors
and donors.
The UN Security Council has also appointed a
"commissioner" under the High Representative to
run an international civilian police force. Irish police
official Peter Fitzgerald, with UN policing experience in
Namibia, El Salvador, and Cambodia (5), presides over
some 1,700 police from 15 countries. The police will be
dispatched to Bosnia after a five-day training program in
Zagreb (6).
The new constitution hands the reins of
economic policy over to the Bretton Woods institutions
and the London based European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD). The IMF is empowered to appoint the
first governor of the Bosnian Central Bank, who, like the
High Representative, "shall not be a citizen of
Bosnia and Herzegovina or a neighboring State."(7)
Under the IMF regency, the Central Bank will
not be allowed to function as a Central Bank: "For
the first six years ... it may not extend credit by
creating money, operating in this respect as a currency
board." Neither will Bosnia be allowed to have its
own currency (issuing paper money only when there is full
foreign exchange backing), nor permitted to mobilize its
internal resources (8). Its ability to self-finance its
reconstruction through an independent monetary policy is
blunted from the outset.
While the Central Bank is in IMF custody, the
EBRD heads the Commission on Public Corporations, which
supervises operations of all public sector enterprises,
including energy, water, postal services,
telecommunications, and transportation. The EBRD
president appoints the commission chair and will direct
public sector restructuring, i.e., the sell-off of state-
and socially-owned assets and the procurement of
long-term investment funds (9). Western creditors
explicitly created the EBRD "to give a distinctively
political dimension to lending (10).
As the West trumpets its support for
democracy, actual political power rests in the hands of a
parallel Bosnian "state" whose executive
positions are held by non-citizens. Western creditors
have embedded their interests in a constitution hastily
written on their behalf. They have done so without a
constitutional assembly and without consultations with
Bosnian citizens' organizations. Their plans to rebuild
Bosnia appear more suited to sating creditors than
satisfying even the elementary needs of Bosnians.
And why not? The neocolonization of Bosnia is
the logical culmination of long Western efforts to undo
Yugoslavia's experiment in market socialism and workers'
self-management and to impose the dictate of a the free
market.
The Shape of Things to Come
Multiethnic, socialist Yugoslavia was once a
regional industrial power and economic success. In the
two decades before 1980, annual gross domestic product
(GDP) growth averaged 6.1 percent, medical care was free,
the literacy was 91 percent, and life expectancy was 72
years (11). But after a decade of Western economic
ministrations and five years of disintegration, war,
boycott, and embargo, the economies of the former
Yugoslavia are prostrate, their industrial sectors
dismantled.
Yugoslavia's implosion was partially due to US
machinations. Despite Belgrade's non-alignment and its
extensive trading relations with the European Community
and the US, the Reagan administration targeted the
Yugoslav economy in a "Secret Sensitive" 1984
National Security Decision Directive (NSDD 133), "Us
Policy towards Yugoslavia." A censored version
declassified in 1990 elaborated on NSDD 64 on Eastern
Europe, issued in 1982. The latter advocated
"expanded efforts to promote a 'quiet revolution' to
overthrow Communist governments and parties," while
reintegrating the countries of Eastern Europe into a
market-oriented economy (12).
The US had earlier joined Belgrade's other
international creditors in imposing a first round of
macroeconomics reform in 1980, shortly before the death
of Marshall Tito. That initial round of restructuring set
the pattern. Throughout the 1980s, the IMF and World Bank
periodically prescribed further doses of their bitter
economic medicine as the Yugoslav economy slowly lapsed
into a coma.
From the beginning, successive IMF sponsored
programs hastened the disintegration of the Yugoslav
industrial sector industrial production declined to a
negative 10 percent growth rate by 1990 (13) and the
piecemeal dismantling of its welfare state, with all the
predictable social consequences. Debt restructuring
agreements, meanwhile, increased foreign debt, and a
mandated currency devaluation also hit hard at Yugoslavs'
standard of living.
Mr. Markovic goes to Washington
In autumn 1989, just before the fall of the
Berlin Wall, Yugoslav federal Premier Ante Markovic met
in Washington with President George Bush to cap
negotiations for a new financial aid package. In return
for assistance, Yugoslavia agreed to even more sweeping
economic reforms, including a new devalued currency,
another wage freeze, sharp cuts in government spending,
and the elimination of socially owned, worker- managed
companies (14). The Belgrade nomenclature, with the
assistance of Western advisers, had laid the groundwork
for Markovic's mission by implementing beforehand many of
the required reforms, including a major liberalization of
foreign investment legislation.
"Shock therapy" began in January
1990. Although inflation had eaten away at earnings, the
IMF ordered that wages be frozen at their mid November
1989 levels. Prices continued to rise unabated, and real
wages collapsed by 41 percent in the first six months of
1990 (15).
The IMF also effectively controlled the
Yugoslav central bank. Its tight money , policy further
crippled the country's ability to finance its economic
and social programs. State revenues that should have gone
as transfer payments to the republics and provinces went
instead to service Belgrade's debt with the Paris and
London clubs. The republics were largely left to their
own devices.
In one fell swoop, the reformers engineered
the final collapse of Yugoslavia's federal fiscal
structure and mortally wounded its federal political
institutions. By cutting the financial arteries between
Belgrade and the republics, the reforms fueled
secessionist tendencies that fed on economic factors as
well as ethnic divisions, virtually ensuring the de facto
secession of the republics.
The IMF-induced budgetary crisis created an
economic fait accompli that paved the way for Croatia's
and Slovenia's formal secession in June 1991.
Crashed by the Invisible Hand
The reforms demanded by Belgrade's creditors
also struck at the heart of Yugoslavia's system of
socially-owned and worker-managed enterprises. As one
observer noted,
The objective was to subject the Yugoslav
economy to massive privatization and the dismantling of
the public sector. The Communist Party bureaucracy, most
notably its military and intelligence sector, was
canvassed specifically and offered political and economic
backing on the condition that wholesale scuttling of
social protections for Yugoslavia's workforce was
imposed." (16)
It was an offer that a desperate Yugoslavia
could not refuse. Advised by Western lawyers and
consultants, Markovic's government passed financial
legislation that forced "insolvent" businesses
into bankruptcy or liquidation. Under the new law, if a
business was unable to pay its bills for 30 days running,
or for 30 days within a 45-day period, the government
would launch bankruptcy proceedings within the next 15
days.
The assault on the socialist economy also
included a new banking law designed to trigger the
liquidation of the socially-owned 3Associated
Banks." Within two years, more than half the
country's banks had vanished, to be replaced by
newly-formed "independent profit-oriented
institutions."
These changes in the legal framework, combined
with the IMF's tight money policy toward industry and the
opening of the economy to foreign competition,
accelerated industrial decline.
From 1989 through September 1990, more than a
thousand companies went into bankruptcy. By 1990, the
annual GDP growth rate had collapsed to a negative 7.5
percent. In 1991, GDP declined by a further 15 percent,
while industrial output shrank by 21 percent (l7)
The IMF package unquestionably precipitated
the collapse of much of Yugoslavia's well-developed heavy
industry. Other socially-owned enterprises survived only
by not paying workers. More than half a million workers
still on company payrolls did not get regular paychecks
in late 1990. They were the lucky ones. Some 600,000
Yugoslavs had already lost their jobs by September 1990,
and that was only the beginning. According to the World
Bank, another 2,435 industrial enterprises, including
some of the country's largest, were slated for
liquidation. Their 1.3 million workers half the remaining
industrial workforce were "redundant."(18)
As 1991 dawned, real wages were in free fall,
social programs had collapsed, and unemployment ran
rampant. The dismantling of the industrial economy was
breathtaking in its magnitude and brutality. Its social
and political impact, while not as easily quantified, was
tremendous. "The pips are squeaking," as
London's Financial Times put it.(19)
Less archly, Yugoslav President Borisav Jovic
warned that the reforms were "having a markedly
unfavorable impact on the overall situation in
society.... Citizens have lost faith in the state and its
institutions.... The further deepening of the economic
crisis and the growth of social tensions has had a vital
impact on the deterioration of the political-security
situation."(20)
The Political Economy of Disintegration
Some Yugoslavs joined together in a doomed
battle to prevent the destruction of their economy and
polity. As one observer found, "worker resistance
crossed ethnic lines, as Serbs, Croats, Bosnians and
Slovenians mobilized ... shoulder to shoulder with their
fellow workers."(21) But the economic struggle also
heightened already tense relations among the republics
and between the republics and Belgrade.
Serbia rejected the austerity plan outright,
and some 650,000 Serbian workers struck against the
federal government to force wage hikes.(22) The other
republics followed different and sometimes
self-contradictory paths.
In relatively wealthy Slovenia, for instance,
secessionist leaders such as Social Democratie party
chair Joze Pucnik supported the reforms: "From an
economic standpoint, I can only agree with socially
harmful measures in our society, such as rising
unemployment or cutting workers' rights, because they are
necessary to advance the economic reform
process."(23)
But at the same time, Slovenia joined other
republics in challenging the federal government's efforts
to restrict their economic autonomy. Both Croatian leader
Franjo Tudjman and Serbia's Slobodan Milosevic joined
Slovene leaders in railing against Yugoslavia's attempts
to impose harsh reforms.(24)
In the multiparty elections in 1990, economic
policy was at the center of the political debate as
separatist coalitions ousted the Communists in Croatia,
Bosnia and Slovenia. Just as economic collapse spurred
the drift toward separation, separation in turn
exacerbated the economic crisis. Cooperation among the
republics virtually ceased. And with the republics at one
another's throats, both the economy and the nation itself
embarked on a vicious downward spiral.
The process sped along as the republican
leadership, deliberately fostered social and economic
divisions to strengthen their own hands: "The
republican oligarchies, who all had visions of a
'national renaissance' of their own, instead of choosing
between a genuine Yugoslav market and hyperinflation,
opted for war which would disguise the real causes of the
economic catastrophe ."(25)
The simultaneous appearance of militias loyal
to secessionist leaders only hastened the descent into
chaos. These militias, with their escalating atrocities,
not only split the population along ethnic lines, they
also fragmented the workers' movement.(26)
Western Help
The austerity measures had laid the basis for
the recolonization of the Balkans. Whether that required
the breakup of Yugoslavia was subject to debate among the
Western powers, with Germany leading the push for
secession and the US, fearful of opening a nationalist
Pandora's box, originally arguing for Yugoslavia's
preservation.
Following Franjo Tudjman's and the rightist
Democratic Union's decisive victory in Croatia in May
1990, German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, in
almost daily contact with his counterpart in Zagreb, gave
his go-ahead for Croatian secession.(27) Germany did not
passively support secession; it "forced the pace of
international diplomacy" and pressured its Western
allies to recognize Slovenia and Croatia. Germany sought
a free hand among its allies "to pursue economic
dominance in the whole of Mittel Europa."(28)
Washington, on the other hand, favored 3a
loose unity while encouraging democratic development ...
[Secretary of State] Baker told Tudjman and [Slovenia's
President] Milan Kucan that the United States would not
encourage or support unilateral secession ... but if they
had to leave, he urged them to leave by a negotiated
agreement. (29)
Instead, Slovenia, Croatia, and finally,
Bosnia fought bloody civil wars against "rump"
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) or Serbian
nationalists or both. But now, the US has belatedly taken
an active diplomatic role in Bosnia, strengthened its
relations with Croatia and Macedonia, and positioned
itself to play a leading role in the region's economic
and political future.
The Post-War Regime
Western creditors have now turned their
attention to Yugoslavia's successor states. As with the
demise of Yugoslavia, the economic aspects of post-war
reconstruction remain largely unheralded, but the
prospects for rebuilding the newly independent republics
appear bleak. Yugoslavia's foreign debt has been
carefully divided and allocated to the successor
republics,(30) which are now strangled in separate debt
rescheduling and structural adjustment agreements.
The consensus among donors and international
agencies is that past macroeconomics reforms adopted
under IMF advice had not quite met their goal and further
shock therapy is required to restore "economic
health" to Yugoslavia's successor states. Croatia
and Macedonia have followed the IMF's direction: Both
have agreed to loan packages to pay off their shares of
the Yugoslav debt that require a consolidation of the
process begun wit Ante Markovic's bankruptcy program. The
all too familiar pattern of plant closings, induced bank
failures, and impoverishment continues apace.
And global capital applauds. Despite an
emerging crisis in social welfare and the decimation of
his economy, Macedonian Finance Minister Ljube Trpevski
proudly informed the press that "the World Bank and
the IMF place Macedonia among the most successful
countries in regard to current transition reforms. (31)
The head of the IMF mission to Macedonia, Paul
Thomsen, agreed. He avowed that "the results of the
stabilization program were impressive" and gave
particular credit to "the efficient wages
policy" adopted by the Skopje government. Still, his
negotiators added, even more budget cutting will be
necessary. (32)
But Western intervention is making its most
serious inroads on national sovereignty in Bosnia. The
neocolonial administration imposed by the Dayton accords
and supported by NATO9s firepower ensures that Bosnia's
future will be determined in Washington, Bonn, and
Brussels not Sarajevo.
Reconstruction Colonial Style
If Bosnia is ever to emerge from the ravages
of war and neocolonialism, massive reconstruction will be
essential. But judging by recent Balkan history, Western
assistance is more likely to drag Bosnia into the Third
World than to lift it to parity with its European
neighbors.
The Bosnian government estimates that
reconstruction costs will reach $47 billion. Western
donors have pledged $3 billion in reconstruction loans,
yet only $518 million dollars have so far been given.
Part of this money is tagged to finance some of the local
civilian costs of IFOR's military deployment and part to
repay international creditors. (33)
Fresh loans will pay back old debt. The
Central Bank of the Netherlands has generously provided
"bridge financing' of $37 million to allow Bosnia to
pay its arrears with the IMF, without which the IMF will
not lend it fresh money. But in a cruel and absurd
paradox, the sought-after loans from the IMF's newly
created "Emergency Window" for
"post-conflict countries" will not be used for
post-war reconstruction. Instead, they will repay the
Dutch Central Bank, which had coughed up the money to
settle IMF arrears in the first place. (34)
Debt piles up, and little new money goes for
rebuilding Bosnia's war torn economy.
While rebuilding is sacrificed on the altar of
debt repayment, Western governments and corporations show
greater interest in gaining access to strategic natural
resources. With the discovery of energy reserves in the
region, the partition of Bosnia between the Federation of
Bosnia- Herzegovina and the Bosnian-Serb Republika Srpska
under the Dayton accords has taken on new strategic
importance. Documents in the hands of Croatia and the
Bosnian Serbs indicate that coal and oil deposits have
been identified on the eastern slope of the Dinarides
Thrust, retaken from rebel Krajina Serbs by the US-backed
Croatian army in the final offensives before the Dayton
accords. Bosnian officials report that Chicago-based
Amoco was among several foreign firms that subsequently
initiated exploratory surveys in Bosnia.(35)
"Substantial" petroleum fields also
lie in the Serb-held part of Croatia just across the Sava
River from Tuzla, the headquarters for the US military
zone.(36) Exploration operations went on during the war,
but the World Bank and the multinationals that conducted
the operations kept local governments in the dark,
presumably to prevent them from acting to grab
potentially valuable areas. (37)
With their attention devoted to debt repayment
and potential energy bonanzas, the Western powers have
shown little interest in rectifying the crimes committed
under the rubric of ethnic cleansing. The 70,000 NATo
troops on hand to "enforce the peace" will
accordingly devote their efforts to administering the
partition of Bosnia in accordance with Western economic
interests rather than restoring the status quo ante.
While local leaders and Western interests
share the spoils of the former Yugoslav economy, they
have entrenched socio ethnic divisions in the very
structure of partition. This permanent fragmentation of
Yugoslavia along ethnic lines thwarts a united resistance
of Yugoslavs of all ethnic origins against the
recolonization of their homeland.
But what's new? As one observer caustically
noted, all of the leaders of Yugoslavia's successor
states have worked closely with the West: "All the
current leaders of the former Yugoslav republics were
Communist Party functionaries and each in turn vied to
meet the demands of the World Bank and the IMF, the
better to qualify for investment loans and substantial
perks for the leadership." (38)
The Only Possible World?
Western-backed neoliberal macroeconomic
restructuring helped destroy Yugoslavia. Yet, since the
onset of war in 1991, the global media have carefully
overlooked or denied their central role. Instead, they
have joined the chorus singing praises of the free market
as the basis for rebuilding a war shattered economy. The
social and political impact of economic restructuring in
Yugoslavia has been carefully erased from our collective
understanding. Opinion-makers instead dogmatically
present cultural, ethnic, and religious divisions as the
sole cause of the crisis. In reality, they are the
consequence of a much deeper process of economic and
political fracturing.
Such false consciousness not only masks the
truth, it also prevents us from acknowledging precise
historical occurrences. Ultimately, it distorts the true
sources of social conflict. When applied to the former
Yugoslavia, it obscures the historical foundations of
South Slavic unity, solidarity and identity. But this
false consciousness lives across the globe, where
shuttered factories, jobless workers, and gutted social
programs are the only possible world, and "bitter
economic medicine" is the only prescription.
At stake in the Balkans are the lives of
millions of people. Macroeconomic reform there has
destroyed livelihoods and made a joke of the right to
work. It has put basic needs such as food and shelter
beyond the reach of many. It has degraded culture and
national identity. In the name of global capital, borders
have been redrawn, legal codes rewritten, industries
destroyed, financial and banking systems dismantled,
social programs eliminated. No alternative to global
capital, be it market socialism or "national"
capitalism, will be allowed to exist.
But what happened to Yugoslavia and now
continues in its weak successor states should resonate
beyond the Balkans. Yugoslavia is a mirror for similar
economic restructuring programs in not only the
developing world, but also in the United States, Canada
and Western Europe. The - Yugoslav reforms are the cruel
reflection of a destructive economic model pushed to the
extreme.
- NOTES
- -- (1) See, e.g., former US Ambassador to
Yugoslavia Robert Zimmerman, 'The Last
Ambassador, A Memoir of the Collapse of
Yugoslavia,'Foreign Affairs,v. 74,n.2,1995.
- -- (2) For a critique, see Milos Vasic,
et al., War Against Bosnia,9 Vreme News Digest
Agency, Apr. 13, 1992.
- -- (3) Testimony of Richard C. Holbrooke,
Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of European
and Canadian Affairs, before the Senate
Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Foreign
Operations, Dec 19, 1995.
- -- (4) Dayton Peace Accords, 'Agreement
on High Representative, Articles I and II, Dec
16, 1995.
- -- (5) United Nation General Secretariat,
Curriculum Vitae of Thomas Peter Fitzgerald, n.d.
(1995).
- -- (6) Dayton Peace Accords, Agreement on
Police Task Force,2 Article II.
- -- (7) Ibid., Agreement on General
Framework, Article VII
- -- (8) Ibid.
- -- (9) Ibid, Agreement Public
Corporations, Article I.10 ---
- -- (10) Stabilizing Europe, The Times
(London), Nov 22, 1990.
- -- (11) World Bank, World Development
Report 1991, Statistical Annex, Tables 1 and 2,
1991.
- -- (12) Sean Gervasi, 'Germany, the US,
and the Yugorlav Crisis,' Covert Action, n. 43,
Winter 1992-93, p 42
- -- (13) World Bank, Industrial
Restructuring Study: Overview, Issues, and
Strategy for Restructuring, Washington, D C, June
1991, pp. 10,14.
- -- (14) Gervasi, op. cit., p. 44
- -- (15) World Bank, Restructuring, op.
cit., p. viii
- -- (16) Ralph Schoenman, 'Divide and Rule
Schemes in the Balkans,9 The Organizer (San
Francisco), Sept. 11,1995
- -- (17) Judit Kiss, 3Debt Management in
Eastern Europe, Eastern European Economics, May
June 1894, p 59
- -- (18) Already laid off and 'redundant
workers constituted fully two thirds of the
industrial work force. World Bank, Restructuring,
op. cit., Annex I
- -- (19) Jurek Martin, 'The road to be
trodden to Kosovo," Financial Times, Mar 13,
1991.
- -- (20) British Broadcasting Service,
3Borisav Jovic Tells SFRY Assembly Situation Has
'Dramatically Deteriorated,'3 Apr 27, 1991.
- -- (21) Schoenman, op. cit.
- -- (22) Gervasi ep cit p 44
- -- (23) Federico Nier Fischer, 3Eastern
Europe: Social Crisis,2 Inter Press Service, Sept
5, 1890
- -- (24) Klas Bergman, 'Markovic Seeks to
Keep Yugoslavia One Nation, Christian Science
Monitor, July 11,1990, p.6.
- -- (25) Dimitrue Boarov, 3A Brief Review
of Anti-Inflation Programs: the Curse of the Dead
Programs, Vreme News Digest Agency, Apr. 13,
1992.
- -- (27) Gervasi, op cit,p 65
- -- (28) Ibid, p 45
- -- (29) Zimmerman,op cit
- -- (30) In June 1995, the IMF, acting on
behalf of creditor banks and Western governments,
proposed to redistribute that debt as follows:
Serbia and Montenegro, 36%, Croatia 28%, Slovenia
16%, Bosnia&Herzegovina, 16% and Macedonia 5%
This article was originally
published in Covert Action
Quarterly
No. 56. Spring 1996. Copyright Michel Chossudovsky
To browse articles at
Emperors-clothes please click here
or go to http://www.globalresistance.com
If you would like to help
Emperors-Clothes... please click here or go to http://www.globalresistance.com/howyour.htm to use our
secure server. All our expenses are covered by donations.
If you would like to send a check, please mail it to Emperor's Clothes, P.O.
Box 610-321, Newton, MA 02461-0321. Thanks.
www.tenc.net
|